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FEDERAL REGULATION OF FETAL RESEARCH: TOWARD A
PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDED ON ETHICAL REASONING
KATHLEEN MARKEY*
The 1975 federal regulations on fetal research reflect the recom-
mendations of a national study commission which formulated a
policy based upon broad ethical considerations. The fetus is now
accorded comprehensive protection in medical experimenta-
tion-protection so comprehensive that necessary and valuable
benefits to future fetuses must be given up. This article suggests
that the regulations be carefully modified to permit greater lati-
tude in conducting research on drug pharmocology in aborted
fetuses. 0
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Medical research on aborted fetuses has engendered significant
controversy in recent years. Fetal research is not new. It was central
in the development of the Salk polio vaccine in the 1950's for exam-
ple, but with widespread legal abortion its scope has greatly ex-
panded. This increased scope has enlarged the controversy sur-
rounding fetal research.'
The increased number of fetal subjects available would appear
to have engendered concern from two groups: anti-abortionists who
cannot reconcile themselves to the Supreme Court's decision legal-
izing early abortions' and who oppose any activity that builds on the
rights to abortion; and ethicists and concerned professionals with
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Recent literature on fetal research includes: Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal
Experimentation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 547 (1975); Comment, Fetal Research: A View from
Right to Life to Wrongful Birth, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1975); Note, Fetal Experimenta-
tion: Moral, Legal and Medical Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1974).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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knowledge of fetal research who fear large-scale abuse of the rights
of fetuses. The approaches to controlling fetal research had been
diverse until the federal government, through the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which funds most medical
research in this country, proposed regulation of fetal research. :' The
regulations enacted in 19751 are the result of recommendations
made to HEW by the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, ' created
to represent the interests of the diverse community. The Commis-
sion was mandated to survey the field and identify basic ethical
principles upon which regulations could be formulated. The result
has been some clarification of the subject matter and a public policy
grounded in ethical reasoning.
After a brief review of the benefits and costs of fetal research,
this paper discusses some of the problems with defining the nature
and status of the fetus, and the legal and ethical rights accorded this
unborn being. Protection of the rights of the fetal being in experi-
mentation is the objective of the 1975 federal regulations in the area.
The extensive changes in these regulations are analyzed with a view
to their impact upon fetal research. In conclusion specific recom-
mendations are proffered which more realistically reconcile the
competing interests involved in fetal research.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY
Some of the controversy surrounding fetal research involves the
meaning of terms because lack of precision in terminology has had
a tendency to obfuscate the issues. Although not entirely settling
the controversy over the meaning of terms, the definitions set forth
in the regulations are used here.
(c) "Fetus" means the product of conception from the time
of implantation until a determination is made, following expul-
sion or extraction of the fetus, that it is viable.
(d) "Viable" as it pertains to the fetus means being able,
after either spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the
benefit of available medical therapy) to the point of indepen-
3. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (1973).
4. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-211 (1975). The regulations remain substantively unchanged in
1976.
5. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342.
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dently maintaining heart beat and respiration ...
(e) "Nonviable fetus" means a fetus ex utero which,
although living, is not viable.'
In addition, "nontherapeutic research," as used here, refers to re-
search not designed with the intention of benefiting this fetus, but
rather of gaining scientific or medical knowledge which may benefit
future lives.
Few areas of medical research have proved to be more produc-
tive for medical progress than fetal research. Fetal cell tissue cul-
tures were used to grow viruses in the development of measles7 and
polio' vaccines. Experiments on live, nonviable, aborted fetuses
have contributed to the development of treatment for asphyxiated
newborns' and methods to increase the chances of survival of extra-
uterine fetuses, which at the present level of medical technology are
nonviable.'
Research on the fetus prior to abortion led to the development
of techniques for intra-uterine blood transfusions for Rh factor in-
compatibility, and to the development of amniocentesis to diagnose
genetic problems prior to birth. Results of in utero studies with
vaccines and drugs to ascertain substances which cross the placenta
and affect the fetus also have been significant. In the 1960's a vac-
cine was developed for rubella which was found safe for adults and
children, but whose safety for pregnant women was unknown. Tests
on rhesus monkeys showed the vaccine would not have the same
effects on pregnant women as the infection would. However, when
the vaccine was administered to women about to undergo an abor-
tion, the experiment revealed that the vaccine crossed the placenta
and infected the human fetus. 2
6. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.203(c)-(e) (1976).
7. See Webb, Illavia & Laurence, Measles-Vaccine Viruses in Tissue-Culture of Non-
Neu 7onal Cells of Human Fetal Brain, 2 LANCET 4 (1971).
8. See Plotkin, Vaccine Production in Human Diploid Cell Strains, 94 AM. J.
EPIDMIOLOGY 303 (1971).
9. See Chamberlain, An Artificial Placenta, 100 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 615 (1968).
10. See Goodlin, Cutaneous Respiration in a Fetal Incubator, 86 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC.
571 (1963).
11. See generally Levin, Oxman, Moore, Daniels & Scheer, Diagnosis of Congenital
Rubella in Utero, 290 N.E.J.M. 1187 (1974).
12. See Vaheri, Vesikari, Oker-Blom, Speppala, Parkman, Veronelli & Robbins,
Isolation of Attenuated Rubella-Vaccine Virus from Human Products of Conception & Uter-
ine Cervix, 286 N.E.J.M. 1071 (1972). See also Biro, Ivin, Elek & Ar, Data on the Tissue
Concentration of Antibiotics in Man. Tissue Concentration of Semi-Synthetic Penicillins in
19771
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It is well established that some experimentation on human
beings is required if medical progress is to be made. Fetal research
is vital in order to gain insights into mental retardation, 3 pre-
maturity, and many types of diseases and birth deformities. One
very strong argument for promoting fetal research in utero on
fetuses about to be aborted is that advances in fetal medicine,
particularly in accelerating fetal lung maturity in utero and samp-
ling fetal blood mid-pregnancy, can only be accomplished through
the use of fetal subjects." Furthermore, although anatomic studies
and chemical analyses of completely dead fetal tissues continue
to yield important information, living tissues, organs, and intact
fetal bodies are still the core of new biomedical research. 5
A third major argument is that performing studies of new pro-
cedures and new drugs on fetuses which will be or have been
aborted, can prevent damage to fetuses who will be carried to term
and bear the burden of prenatal damage throughout their life-
times." This argument belies any justification for discarding
aborted nonviable fetuses without utilizing them to help future in-
fants to be free from defects. In addition, it has been argued that if
there is "no research on unwanted aborted fetuses, it will be done
on wanted fetuses,"'" because every new drug, procedure, and vac-
cine must be tested for the first time on a human being." The value
and benefits of fetal research then are great.
On the cost side, it is posited that the question and related
controversy is not whether medical knowledge of pregnancy and
fetal development ought to be expanded, but rather how far fetal
research should go without violating ethical principles. Opponents
of fetal research who stress this issue include those who are unwill-
the Fetus, 3 INT'L J. CLIN. PHARMOCOL. 321 (1970); Marx, Drugs During Pregnancy: Do They
Affect the Unborn Child? 180 Sci. 174 (1973).
13. See generally Milunsky, Medico-Legal Issues in Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in
GENETICS AND THE LAW 53 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
14. See Mahoney, Implications of Restrictions on Fetal Research for Biomedical
Advance, AM. FED'N FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH, May 3, 1975, 210, 229-30.
15. Id. at 229. But cf. Steinfels, Ethics & Fetal Research, 102 COMMONWEAL 109, 110
(1975) (It is arguable that similar knowledge might be attainable through alternative ap-
proaches).
16. Walters, Fetal Research & the Ethical Issues, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1975,
at 13, 16.
17. Gaylin & Lappe, Fetal Politics, 235 ATLANTIC, May 1975, at 66, 71.
18. "Since [researchersl did not test thalidomide on unwanted fetuses, [it was] tested
unwittingly on wanted ones." Id.
[Vol. 31:675
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ing to accept the Roe decision and its consequences.
A larger group of opponents, however, contend that benefit to
the health of others is not as valuable as protecting from physical
invasion and exploitation involuntary subjects whom this group
views as human beings upon conception.'9 Although consideration
of the greater social good is sometimes used to justify the exclusion
of individual interest,"0 it is a basic ethical principle that genuine
gains are not sufficient justification for questionable activity.2 '
The emphasis on research and experimentation has produced
some studies that have created significant controversy." Thus the
medical "good" of experiments may not necessarily be equated with
the social good. Studies considered legitimate in their inception
may later arouse public outcry for strong measures to limit research.
This was illustrated by a recent grand jury indictment of four doc-
tors for grave-robbery for their part in studying post-abortion fe-
tuses whose mothers had been given antibiotics.23 It is essential that
independent ethical judgment be used in examining the contro-
versy over the use of fetal subjects.
II. STATUS OF THE FETUS
The crucial issue in the fetal research controversy is the status
of the fetus. However, it is an issue surrounded by uncertainties,
because in law, philosophy, and religion the status of the fetus is
unsettled. Should it be treated as a person, as human tissue, akin
to a laboratory animal, or in a unique category of its own?
The Commission did not resolve the issue of the nature of the
19. There are conflicting positions on when the fetus becomes human and entitled to the
rights and protections of human beings. The postures range from the point of conception
(Roman Catholic Church position) to the point of viability (the legal position of Roe).
20. Moffat, The Indispensable Role of Independent Ethical Judgment, 21 U. FLA. L. REv.
477, 481 (1969).
21. Steinfels, supra note 15, at 110.
22. In one study researchers decapitated eight live aborted fetuses to study oxidation in
the brain. Adam, Raiha, Rahiala, & Kekomai, Cerebral Oxidation of Glucose & d-boh-
butyrate by the Isolated Perfused Human Fetal Head, 7 PED. REs. 309 (1973).
23. On April 11, 1974, a Boston grand jury indicted four doctors for grave-robbing be-
cause they had not secured consent from next of kin for examining dead fetuses. Culliton,
Grave-Robbing: The Charge Against Four from Boston City Hospital, 186 Scl. 420 (1974).
The doctors conducted research whereby women about to abort consented to taking anti-
biotics. Post-abortion, the fetus was studied to ascertain whether, and in what amounts, the
antibiotics crossed the placenta and entered the fetus. Philipson, Sabath & Charles,
Transplacental Passage of Erythromycin and Clindamycin, 288 N.E.J.M. 1219 (1973).
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fetus. In its Deliberations and Conclusions24 it reviewed some of the
complex problems in the area, but nowhere did it try to define
status; it described the fetus under the heading of "human subject."
Nor did the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade25 resolve the issue. The
Court did not find a direct conflict between the right of the mother's
privacy and the right of the fetus to life; it worked out a compromise
where the potential life of the fetus ripens at the point of viability.2"
While the Court did "not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins," 7 it did hold that the constitutional meaning of "person"
does not include the unborn." However, the dicta in Roe cannot be
conclusive in the fetal research area because the Court in Roe was
faced with very different issues than the rights of a fetus to protec-
tion from experimentation after the abortion decision has been
made. The extent of the constitutional rights of this being in the
context of the post-abortion decision then, is not fully resolved.
The nature of the fetus remains the crux of the problem. The
nonviable fetus does not appear to be identical with a human being.
Ex utero it has no independent life system. On the other hand,
categorization of the fetus as part of the mother's body, like a tooth
or a tumor "is a trivialization of the grandeur of human potential.""
The fetus is indeed a part of the mother's body, but is a unique
part-the only part destined to leave the mother's body, and take
up an individual and independent existence as a human being.'
The potential for life makes the fetus qualitatively different
from being living tissue or a subhuman animal. Its potential for
becoming a person places it in its own distinct class of entities. This
class should be defined in relation to other categories by searching
24. Commission Report: Deliberations and Conclusions, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June
1975, 41 [hereinafter cited as Commission Report]. In the preface to its deliberations, the
Commission stated:
Although the Commission has not addressed itself directly to the issues of the
personhood and the civil status of the fetus, the members of the Commission are
convinced that moral concern should extend to all who share human genetic
heritage, and that the fetus, regardless of life prospects, should be treated respect-
fully and with dignity.
Id.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. Id. at 163.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id. at 157-58.
29. Gaylin and Lapp6, supra note 17, at 67.
30. Siegel, A Bias for Life, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1975, 23, 24.
[Vol. 31:67:
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out similarities and dissimilarities which would justify differences
in the protection and rights of the fetug.31
III. THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL RIGHTS OF THE FETUS
A. Legal
The legal rights of the fetus are those which the common law
tradition endeavors to guarantee and protect. Anglo-American law
has displayed a certain ambivalence with regard to the fetus by
according it some, but not all, of the legal rights of a person. 2 In
most instances society has required live birth for the rights and
protections of personhood to mature. It has been noted that this use
of the concept of live birth as the trigger for asserting the right to
legal protection probably arose because of judicial skepticism about
the reliability of other means of ascertaining life, rather than be-
cause of any fundamental notion about when human life begins. 3
There are some exceptions, however, to the live birth require-
ment of law. In the common law of torts the unborn child was
considered a part of the mother and had no independent rights of
recovery. 34 In recent years courts have rejected this rule and permit-
ted recovery by the child for prenatal injury. The earliest cases so
holding established viability as the test for recovery, 5 but later
courts have permitted recovery without regard to whether the child
was viable at the time of injury.3" Furthermore, courts have begun
to allow parents to maintain wrongful death actions for fetuses
which are stillborn as a result of the act of the defendant.
3 7
31. Steinfels, supra note 15, at 110. But see Wasserstrom, The Status of the Fetus, 5
HASTINGS CENTER REP., June,, 1975, 18, 19-20. This view of the status of the fetus as a distinct
entity goes a long way toward making experimentation on nonviable fetuses ex utero less
troublesome. But it also makes abortion a morally worrisome act because it involves destruc-
tion of an entity with the potential to be a person.
32. See Louisefl, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233 (1969); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical
Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971).
33. Capron, A Legal Analysis of Definitions of Fetal Status, AM. FED'N FOR CLINICAL
RESEARCH, May 3, 1975, at 223.
34. E.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (Holmes, J.).
35. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
36. E.g., Daley v. Meier, 33 II. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Torigian v. Water-
town News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542,
125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
37. E.g., Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Hatala v. Mar-
kiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188
19771
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The property rights of the child in ventre sa mere are very old
in the common law. In most jurisdictions the unborn child is recog-
nized as a living heir for the purpose of taking an estate,3" and thus
his legal life begins at conception. It should be noted, however, that
the primary reason for this rule is to fulfill the donor's intent that
children not born at dhe time of the gift hav@ a ghare. In equity it
has been held that an unborn child, through a guardian, can main-
tain an action to compel the father to support him or her prior to
birth.59
In the context of constitutional law, the Supreme Court in Roe
stated that the "word 'person', as used in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, does not include the unborn.""0 The Court did not define the
time at which life begins, but it did rely on viability as the point at
which the fetus' potential for life becomes a compelling interest to
be protected. The Court focused on the point of viability because it
is the point at which the growing organism is potentially able to live
outside of the mother.4' The Court offered no guideline as to how the
nonviable fetus was to be treated once outside of the womb. Under
Roe then, the fetus has no protectible legal rights prior to viability
because its existence and survival can be terminated by an abortion:
during the pre-viable stage the maternal interests, particularly pri-
vacy, predominate over potential life. It would seem, therefore, that
if fetal life before viability is so totally unprotected by the constitu-
tion, any restriction on fetal experimentation must find grounds
other than fetal humanity and concomitant constitutional rights."
B. Ethical
The judicial withholding of legal rights from the fetus does not
by itself resolve the question under what conditions the fetus is
entitled to ethical considerations. Such considerations are not ap-
N.W.2d 785 (1971). All cases involved fetuses deemed viable at time of injury.
38. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834); Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152,
52 S.E.2d 352 (1949).
39. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940).
40. 410 U.S. at 158.
41. One problem with using the point of viability is that it will change as technology
improves; new devices and procedures will reduce the age of viability.
42. See McCormick, Fetal Research, Morality and Public Policy, 5 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., June 1975, 26, 30.
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propriately defined in specific terms. They encompass the entire
spectrum of moral and societal concerns valued by our culture. Doc-
tors Willard Gaylin and Marc Lapp6 of the Institute of Society,
Ethics and Life Sciences have asserted that permitting abortion but
drawing the line at fetal experimentation is irrational. They argue
that since abortion is going to dismember, destroy, and discard the
fetus, research on the fetus beforehand (as in pre-abortion drug
studies) is a small indignity.43 Furthermore, they assert that "[fetal
research] endows the process of abortion with human values it will
not otherwise have.
44
On the other hand, this view seems predicated on a notion that
since the worst will be done to the fetus, lesser acts beforehand are
justified by the clear benefit to others of such experiments. It has
been argued that this approach offends basic canons of ethics and
substitutes a "net-benefits" utilitarianism for protection of the indi-
vidual.45 Furthermore, such appeal to benefit to society is based
upon a hypothetical good to indeterminate interests in the future."
These hypothetical future benefits are not considered sufficient to
outweigh the risks to the fetal subject.
Another argument concerning deleterious consequences of re-
search on nonviable fetuses to be aborted is that it reflects a judg-
ment that the valuations of "human dignity" may be changed if
the subject's life expectancy is certain rather than indefinite. Thus
it would seem that a subject becomes less a protectible human as
death nears, an approach not in accord with the ethical principles
regarding the treatment of dying or condemned subjects. 7 The argu-
ment continues that such an attitude could result in society becom-
ing less sensitive to the value of human life. This is specious reason-
ing in that it is dependent upon the nonviable fetus being accorded
the status of a human individual. A valid distinction can be made
where fetal subjects and fully human subjects are concerned. A
violation of the fetus' integrity might be justified on the ground that
it will not have a significant effect on society's protection of the
43. Gaylin & Lapp6, supra note 17, at 70.
44. Id. at 71.
45. P. RAMSEY, ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH (1975); Tiefel, The Cost of Fetal Research:
Ethical Considerations, 294 N.E.J.M. 85, 89 (1976).
46. See Toulmin, Exploring the Moderate Consensus, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June
1975, 31, 36-37.
47. Martin, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 547, 568-
69 (1975).
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vulnerable. Experimentation on a twelve-week fetus is so clearly
distinguishable from experimentation on a one year old child or a
comatose person that such an effect is not significant."
The question of whether, in cases where abortion and death are
imminent, different standards for fetal research are justified, was
the most difficult for the Commission to resolve." After taking ex-
tensive testimony and after much deliberation, the Commission left
the question for further study by recommending that a national
ethics review board should rule on special problems related to the
interpretation or application of its guidelines. ' ,
C. Consent
The ethical problem regarding consent in fetal experimentation
is a thorny issue. Proxy consent is usually deemed sufficient in
research involving minors, although there is. a growing trend against
proxy consent for children in nontherapeutic research.5' There is
strong sentiment in the fetal experimentation area that maternal
proxy consent for the fetus is morally questionable. Since the preg-
nant woman refuses to carry the fetus, the normal assumption on
which proxy consent is based, that the proxy has the subject's best
interests at heart, is weakened.5" This view holds that consent,
therefore, is unobtainable and condemns all fetal experimentation
as unethical.
Another view sees proxy consent by the parents, or mother
alone, although not required as a means of looking after the best
interests of the fetus, as required because the parents retain a nor-
mal psychological stake in their issue, 3 and because of the close
relationship between the mother and the fetus. Parental consent is
48. See id. at 565.
49. The National Commission and Fetal Research: Introduction, 5 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., June 1975, 11, 12 [hereinafter cited as National Commission].
50. Commission Recommendations Nos. 5 & 6, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1975, 45-
46. In the course of deliberation some of the commissioners agreed that a planned abortion
did alter the definition of "minimal risk" to the fetus, if not the "status of the fetus per se."
Commission Report, supra note 24, at 42-43.
51. See, e.g., Burger, Reflections on Law & Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
436, 438 (1968); Mishkin, Multidisciplinary Review for the Protection of Human Subjects in
Biomedical Research: Present & Prospective HEW Policy, 54 B.U.L. REV. 278, 281-83 (1974).
52. P. RAMSEY, supra note 45, at 98; Tiefel, supra note 45, at 88.
53. See Toulmin, supra note 46, at 39; Wasserstrom, supra note 31, at 22.
[Vol. 31:675
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not then a sufficient condition for research on the fetus, but it
should be a necessary condition. The Commission 4 and the regula-
tions 5 adopt this view.
Requiring consent of both parents does not completely resolve
the problem; it does not fully meet the need of the fetal being for
protection. In order to accord that more complete protection, it is
suggested that an advocate for the fetus be provided, an indepen-
dent individual who would represent the fetus and have authority
to decide the question of consent to experimentation.
IV. REGULATION OF FETAL RESEARCH
A. Background
It is clear that some limits must exist to the quest for medical
knowledge; the issue is where to set those limits. In the wake of the
Roe decision and the increase in the supply of aborted fetuses as
research subjects, there arose an increased concern with fetal experi-
mentation. Several state legislatures reacted immediately, in part
as a result of anti-abortion sentiment, fears of Frankensteinian
experiments, as well as concerns for human dignity, and enacted
statutes severely regulating or prohibiting fetal experimentation,
particularly experimentation on aborted fetuses."6 At that time var-
ious bills and amendments restricting fetal research were passed by
the House of Representatives.5" It seemed, however, that HEW, as
the source of more than 80 percent of the funding of medical re-
search in the United States,"8 was the logical agency to promulgate
regulations. In 19731 and 1974, 'o after lengthy deliberations aimed
at forming a sound ethical foundation upon which the regulations
could rest, HEW published proposed regulations of experiments on
human subjects including fetuses.
In July of 1974, Congress imposed a moratorium on fetal re-
54. Commission Report, supra note 24, at 43.
55. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208(b), 46.209(d) (1976).
56. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §
35-1-58.5-6 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14: 87.2 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1574
(Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (Supp. 1975).
57. National Commission, supra note 49, at 11.
58. Goldstein, Fetal Research in the Balance, 10 TRIAL, July 1974, 53; see S. Rep. No.
381 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
59. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (1973).
60. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974).
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search involving live, whole fetuses before and after induced abor-
tion and created the Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects to investigate the entire area of research on human subjects. "1
The Commission's first task was to focus upon fetal research, de-
velop guidelines for all federally funded research and make recom-
mendations to HEW for final regulations. The Commission operates
in public and is composed of nonresearchers. It has conducted ex-
tensive ethical deliberations to come up with ethical principles upon
which a policy of regulation should be based.
Although many researchers resent "outside" interference with
their work, an independent Commission has several advantages.
First, each profession has certain institutionalized values which rep-
resent the best interests, as the profession sees them, of both the
profession and society. These strong internal values raise questions
concerning the right of a profession to make partial judgments for
society. 2 Second, technical competence in a given area is not suffi-
cient to assure that a person is an expert in evaluating a system to
make policy decisions for that area. 3 Third, although experience in
a given area does, in many cases, increase awareness and sensitivity
to the humanitarian and social problems in the area, the same expe-
rience can also harden the professional into insensitivity and alien-
ate him from society's frame of reference. 4 Therefore, although the
professional does have immediate responsibility for his subject, this
does not put him in the best position to make the policy decisions
necessary to resolve the ethical problems.
B. The 1975 Regulations
The 1975 regulations"5 of research involving fetuses and preg-
nant women substantially adopt the Commission's recommenda-
tions. Thus they represent a moderate consensus advocating a sys-
tem of social controls designed to limit the scope and prevent the
61. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, 348.
62. Moffat, supra note 20.
63. Veatch, Medical Ethics: Professional or Universal? 65 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 531,
546-48 (1972).
64. Id.
65. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-211 (1975). The regulations, as did the Commmission, recognize
that research involving the dead fetus and fetal materials is governed by applicable state or
local law, such as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1975). As previously
noted, the regulations remain substantially unchanged in 1976.
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abuse of fetal experimentation.'6 The regulations recognize the fetus
as a human subject deserving of care and respect regardless of its
life prospects. They also recognize that some use of the fetus as a
research subject is in the public interest as it is the only subject
through which specific significant advances in health care can be
attained. While mutually limiting, these two perspectives are not
incompatible.
The regulations apply to all research and related activities sup-
ported or conducted by HEW. 7 All research directed toward fetuses
and pregnant women is first subjected to general limitations: (1) the
necessary completion of appropriate animal studies; (2) minimal
risk to the fetus in nontherapeutic research; (3) separation of re-
searchers from decisions regarding the timing or method of abortion
or regarding the viability of the fetus ex utero; (4) no introduction
of significant changes into the abortion procedure solely in the inter-
ests of research where such changes may cause greater than minimal
risk to either the fetus or the pregnant woman; and (5) no induce-
ments offered to abort for purposes of research." These limitations
require that the research be important and obtainable by no other
means, and subject the human fetus to minimal risk.
Furthermore, prior to commencement of research, informed
consent must be sought and obtained in order for the research to be
ethically acceptable. Informed consent is a necessary prerequisite
for all types of research, but review of adequate consent usually
has consisted of checking consent forms. The Commission
recommended, 9 and the regulations70 adopt, a new and far stricter
form of consent. Provision is made for active monitoring of the en-
tire consent process by Institutional Review Boards7 set up by indi-
66. Toulmin, supra note 46, at 31.
67. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1976).
68. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206 (1976).
69. Commission Recommendations, supra note 50, No. 8 at 46.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 46.205 (1976).
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.205(a)(2) (1976) provides for the additional duties of Institutional
Review Boards:
(2) Determine that adequate consideration has been given to the manner in
which potential subjects will be selected, and adequate provision has been made
by the applicant or offeror for monitoring the actual informed consent process
(e.g., through such mechanisms, when appropriate, a s participation by the Insti-
tutional Review Board or subject advocates in: (i) Overseeing the actual process
by which individual consents required by this subpart are secured either by ap-
proving induction of each individual into the activity or verifying, perhaps
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vidual institutions who are applicants for research grants from
HEW. These boards must be composed of at least five members
with varying backgrounds. No board member may be involved in
review of an activity in which he has a conflicting interest, nor may
the board consist entirely of people who are associated with the
institution or who are members of a single professional group.72 The
boards review applications and have the responsibility for imple-
menting HEW regulations for the protection of human subjects."
Monitoring will consist of overseeing the actual consent process
and intervening where unanticipated risks arise. This provision
marks a major change in policy for it establishes active monitoring
of the consent procedure for the first time. This policy assures ade-
quacy of the consent process and prevents unfair discrimination in
the selection of research subjects.7 4 The provision for review of the
consent process in research conducted on fetal subjects and preg-
nant women may presage the establishment of similar requirements
for other types of research. The Commission is continuing its work
in other areas of research and it seems likely that overseeing consent
procedures for other subjects, particularly children, may be recom-
mended to HEW in the future.
The new regulations distinguish between research on the preg-
nant woman as the primary subject and research primarily directed
toward the fetus.7" The Commission further distinguished between
therapeutic and nontherapeutic research, recommending that ther-
apeutic research directed toward these two subjects should be en-
couraged.7" The regulations do not specifically endorse therapeutic
research, but seem to do so impliedly in specifying guidelines for
research directed primarily toward meeting the health needs of the
subject. These guidelines consist of the general preconditions dis-
cussed above and consent of the mother and the father."
through sampling, that approved procedures for induction of individuals into the
activity are being followed, and (ii) monitoring the progress of the activity and
intervening as necessary through such steps as visits to the activity site and
continuing evaluation to determine if any unanticipated risks have arisen).
72. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b)(1976).
73. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975).
74. Commission Recommendations, supra note 50, No. 8 at 46.
75. Id. Nos. 1-7 at 45-46.
76. Id. Nos. 1 & 2 at 45.
77. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207-.208 (1976). The regulations require parental consent (with rea-
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Research directed toward the pregnant woman to meet her
health care needs is recognized as the preeminent right. Except for
the requirement that she consent, there are no restrictions on thera-
peutic research upon her as long as the risks to the fetus are mini-
mized as much as possible. The consent of the father is not required
here.7" This is consistent with the Roe decision and most moral and
ethical disciplines because the benefits to the mother outweigh the
potential risks to the fetus. With respect to nontherapeutic research
on the pregnant woman, it is restricted to experimentation which
imposes minimal or no risk to the fetus. Such research, furthermore,
requires the consent of both mother and father. 9
Research on the fetus in utero, both therapeutic and nonthera-
peutic, is permissible only if both parents consent and the risk to
the fetus is minimal.5 That is, no research is permitted upon fetuses
in utero prior to abortion that would not also be permitted on a fetus
carried to term. The regulation incorporates the Commission's view
that all fetuses in utero are deserving of care and respect whatever
their age, their life expectancy, or the circumstances. " In substan-
tially incorporating the Commission's recommendations on this
highly controversial point, HEW noted that since the Commission
was created to represent the best judgment of the community and
had conducted extensive deliberations, it was reasonable to accept
its findings as the best possible judgment on the matter. 2
The use of a minimal risk standard is problematic because
there is no indication in the regulations what that means. The Com-
mission in its recommendations did affirm that manifest risks im-
posed upon nonconsenting subjects were not tolerable, and thus
only minimal risks were permissible. It also affirmed that the
sonable exceptions for the father's consent) while the Commission had recommended that
maternal consent is sufficient as long as the father does not object. In making the change,
HEW
concluded that implementation of a provision for absence of objection might
present serious problems. Since the absence of objection can best be verified by
requesting consent, the Department . . . retained the requirement for parental
consent when the father's identity and whereabouts can reasonably be ascer-
tained, and if he is reasonably available.
40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,527 (1975).
78. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(a)(1), (b)(1) (1976).
79. Id. at §§ 46.207(a)(2)-(b)(4) (1976).
80. Id. § 46.208 (1976).
81. See Commission Recommendations, supra note 50, Nos. 4 & 5 at 45.
82. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,528 (1975).
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woman's decision for abortion did not change the fetus' status re-
garding minimal risk. However, differences of interpretation regard-
ing what is risk to the fetus expected to be carried to term and what
is risk to the fetus about to be aborted did arise. Therefore, the
Commission recommended a national review board to resolve prob-
lems in interpreting what constitutes risk to the about-to-be aborted
fetus. 3 The regulations adopt this recommendation and provide for
a national Ethical Advisory Board"4 which HEW will utilize to re-
view research proposals that require further evaluation of the defini-
tion of risk. 5 This, however, does not fully resolve the dilemma for
researchers trying to ascertain what constitutes minimal risk to the
fetus about to be aborted.
One commissioner stressed a further complexity in determining
minimal risk where the research is a first trial. In first trials on a
fetal subject the risks are almost always unknown because of the
differences in physiology and pharmacology in human and mam-
malian fetuses. Unknown risk then is very difficult to determine and
should not be classified as minimal risk."
A definition of minimal risk remains unclear. Likewise, the
question whether the impending abortion alters the degree of risk
to the fetus remains unresolved. Several commentators have argued
that while a woman's decision for abortion does not change the
fetus' status per se, the impending death of the fetus is a morally
relevant fact which may justify greater latitude in determining
risk." Similarly it has been argued that even if the nonviable fetus
is categorized separately as a being with the potentiality of becom-
ing a person, once abortion or impending abortion removes that
factor of potentiality, greater latitude in research can be justified.8
On the other hand, strong objection is made to any change in
the protection of the fetus who is about to be aborted for two rea-
sons. It is first argued that change in determination of risk because
the fetus is about to die violates the autonomy and integrity of the
83. Commission Report, supra note 24, at 42-43.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1976).
85. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975).
86. Lebacqz, Important Elaborations in Fetal Research: Response to the Recom-
mendations, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1975, 11.
87. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 42; Toulmin, supra note 46.
88. See Steinfels, supra note 15, at 111.
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fetus."9 "A woman's decision to have an abortion, however,
protected by Roe . . .in the interests of her privacy or freedom of
her own body, does not change the nature or quality of fetal life.""0
The second reason given is the woman's right to change her mind
about the abortion. If the mother does change her mind after pre-
abortion experimentation has begun, the possibilities may be in-
creased of giving birth to an unnecessarily injured child. Moreover,
the fact that potentially damaging experiments have been per-
formed on her fetus may constitute an inducement not to change her
mind, thereby interfering with her freedom of choice.9 It is also
argued that research on the fetus prior to abortion may be a source
of grief and guilt to the mother" against which she should be pro-
tected. The regulations do not fully clarify whether the risk factor
is modified when the fetal subject is about to be aborted, leaving
final resolution on this issue to the Ethical Advisory Board.
Research on the fetus during the abortion procedure itself was
dealt with by the Commission in its recommendation on research
on the nonviable fetus ex utero,3 but no separate provision for this
is contained in the regulations. 4 However, the recommendation in-
cluded a precondition that no procedural change be introduced into
the abortion procedure in the interest of the research alone. The
regulations substantially incorporate this precondition into the gen-
eral limitations on all research directed toward pregnant women and
fetuses by qualifying the restriction of procedural changes to those
which impose no greater than minimal risk. 5
Once the fetus is outside the womb, an independent party must
determine the viability of the fetus. If viable it will be treated as a
premature infant. 7 If the fetus might possibly be viable, it is
afforded the minimal risk standard. That is, no additional risk to
89. Louisell, Compelled to Disagree in Fetal Research: Response to the Recom-
mendations, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1975, 9.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Wasserstrom, supra note 31, at 22.
92. Toulmin, supra note 46, at 35.
93. Commission Recommendations, supra note 50, No. 6 at 45-46.
94. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1976).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(4) (1975): "No procedural changes which may cause greater
than minimal risk to the fetus or the pregnant woman will be introduced into the procedure
for terminating the pregnancy solely in the interest of the activity."
96. Id. § 46.206(a)(3)(ii) (1976).
97. Id. §46.203(d) (1976).
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the possibility of viability can be imposed upon the fetus. If that
standard is met, it is further required that the research be important
and obtainable through no other means." This assures that a fetus
with even the smallest chance of viability is accorded due care and
dignity.
Research directed toward the nonviable fetus ex utero is per-
mitted if the activities do not, of themselves, terminate the heart-
beat or respiration of the fetus, the research is important for
biomedical knowledge and cannot be obtained by other means, and
parental consent is obtained.9 In adopting this regulation, HEW
incorporated for the most part the Commission's recommendations
for the same reasons as it followed the recommendations regarding
research on the fetus in utero-the Commission represents the best
judgment of the community.1 0 Thus the regulations adopt the view-
point that the dying of the nonviable fetus alters the situation in two
ways. First, since the dying fetus cannot be injured for life and
cannot be saved, the question of risk becomes less relevant. Second,
since the abortion is completed, there is no risk of the mother chang-
ing her mind which will result in a living but possibly injured
child.'0 ' However, even though the risk factor is less relevant, con-
siderations of respect for the dignity of the fetus remain and require
that the fetus be accorded the respect of the dying. Therefore, the
only nontherapeutic research permitted on the nonviable fetus is
that which does not alter the duration of the fetus' life.10 2
In the commentary on the Commission's recommendations, two
commissioners noted that scientific opinion is divided upon whether
or not the nonviable fetus feels pain. If it is ascertained that the
fetus does feel pain, it is argued that respect for the dignity of the
subject may require, on humanitarian grounds, that its pain be
minimized even to the extent that its lifespan is shortened. 03
The regulation of research on nonviable fetuses ex utero does
contain one major exception .to the Commission's recommendations.
The Commission had recommended the prohibition of any change
98. Id. § 46.209(a) (1976).
99. Id. §§ 46.209(b)(2)-(3), (d) (1976).
100. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,528 (1975).
101. Commission Report, supra note note 24, at 43.
102, Id.
103. Lebacqz, supra note 86, at 11-12 (Commissioner Jonsen concurs with Lebacqz' point
of view).
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in the duration of the fetus' life.'"4 However the regulations permit
research whereby "[v]ital functions of the fetus . . . [can] be
artifically maintained . . . where the purpose of the activity is to
develop new methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of
viability."' ' HEW excepted to the Commission's view on this point
because the Secretary was "persuaded by the weight of scientific
evidence that research performed on the nonviable fetus ex utero
has contributed substantially to the ability of physicians to bring
to viability increasingly small fetuses."' ' Thus the regulation recog-
nizes that it is in the public interest to continue this vital research.
Some support for this position can be found in the principle which
holds that research is ethically more acceptable the more closely it
approximates the interests of the subject. It would not be unreason-
able, then, to suggest-that the dying nonviable fetus, just as any
other dying subject, would have an interest in the development of
technology which is aimed at allowing others like it to survive."7
Objection to this exception, which allows the duration of the
fetus' life to be altered, stresses that the nonviable fetus loses both
its dignity in dying and the protection from violation of its integrity.
It is argued that permitting this alteration violates the convictions
of the regulations and the Commission that the fetus should be
treated respectfully and with dignity regardless of its life expect-
ancy.
0 8
Finally, the regulations recognize the difficulty of applying all
the regulations to special research problems, and therefore set up a
mechanism for waiver or modification of specific requirements. 9
The waiver or modification can onlybe made by HEW after a re-
quest is made by the applicant and approved by the Ethical Advi-
sory Board which should encourage public participation in the re-
view. Decision is to be -made after weighing all the risks to the
subject against any benefits to the subject and the importance of the
knowledge to be gained. This provision is laudable because it does
104. Commission Recommendations, supra note 50, No. 6 at 46.
105. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1976).
106. 40 Fed. Reg, 33,526, 33,528 (1975).
107. Lebacqz, supra note 86, at 12.
108. Tiefel, supra note 45, at 88. Accord, McCormick & Waiters, A Good Beginning in
Fetal Research: Response to the Recommendations, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1975, 13;
see Ramsey, in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,539 (1975) (summary of paper submitted to the
Commission).
109. 45 C.F.R. § 46.211 (1976).
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permit the regulations to be adapted to different circumstances,""
but it is also strongly opposed. The opposition sees the provision as
an escape hatch from human experimentation principles simply by
employing the decision of a fallible national review board. Accord-
ing to this view, the provision does not provide the unborn with the
protection of recognized limits on human experimentation."'
The regulations have not solved all the problems related to fetal
research nor provided protection of the fetus which is acceptable to
everyone in terms of being neither too restrictive nor too liberal.
However:
[Tihe overall protective thrust of the [regulations] is a major
step in the right direction. What is perhaps more important than
the. . . conclusions themselves is the way in which this problem
was faced, not only by legislation or political tradeoffs, or judicial
fiat, but by a representative public commission that elicited the
views of persons from differing backgrounds, competences and
convictions, conducted public discussions, and deliberated
openly and candidly on the problem and its implications."2
V. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has indicated that the 1975 federal regulations of
fetal research go far in acknowledging fetal dignity and providing
the fetus in utero and the nonviable fetus ex utero with comprehen-
sive protection. The greater protection, however, necessarily
diminishes the benefits accruing to society from fetal research. In
one major area of research, that directed toward understanding the
factors which modify placental transfer of drugs and their subse-
quent movement into the fetus, too much potential benefit may
have been given up for a small amount of protection.
There are frequent references in the medical literature to the
potential effects on the fetus of drugs administered to the mother,
but only a few drugs have been positively identified as teratogenic
whereas many have shown the potential for being teratogenic. ' a
It is extremely difficult to predict what types of effects a drug
110. See Commission Report, supra note 24, at 44.
111. See Louisell, supra note 89.
112. McCormick & Waiters, supra note 108, at 13-14.
113. Mirkin, Impact of Public Policy on the Development of Drugs For Pregnant Women
and Children, AM. FED'N FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH, May 3, 1975, at 233, 235.
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necessary for the mother's health is going to have on the fetus unless
its actions have been tested in other fetuses. The only way new
drugs can be tested on the fetus today is when the mother needs
them; the situation then becomes a balancing between the interests
of the mother's health care and the interests of the fetus in protec-
tion. "[T]his type of 'after the fact' investigative approach is ineffi-
cient and- least likely to yield the information required to develop a
rational therapeutic framework.""'
The regulations do not permit nontherapeutic research relating
to drug pharmocology on the fetus in utero unless there is no risk or
minimal risk. Since the unknown actions of new drugs and vaccines
on the fetus do not fall within acceptable risk, biomedicine must
wait to ascertain the information from the later-born children whose
mothers needed the drug. Such an approach seems to provide a
small degree of protection to a subject about to expire at a cost of
losing vital information about the action of drugs in the fetus. It
constitutes a loss of knowledge which would be of significant benefit
to fetuses carried to term and not just some hypothetical good that
may occur in the indefinite future.
Therefore, it is submitted that this type of research be con-
ducted within carefully constructed guidelines on fetuses about to
be aborted. The research would be ethically permissable since the
impending death of the fetus is a morally relevant factor which
changes the situation.' A possible harmful effect on the fetus about
to die from an abortion is very different from that which constitutes
harm in the fetus expected to be carried to term.
Moreover, safeguards can be maintained regarding the risk of
the mother changing her mind about the abortion. It is possible to
ascertain a group of women where change of mind is a minimal risk;
these women have compelling social and psychological pressures
which would tend to prevent any change of mind. An additional
safeguard can be implemented in the research design by providing
for an advocate for the fetus. The advocate would be an independent
person appointed to represent the fetus and thereby help to insure
that the final decision represents a balance between the interests of
the fetus with those of the researcher and society. It is suggested
that the cost of the advocate for the fetus be written into the original
114. Id. at 236.
115. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
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research application for funding.
Permitting drug pharmocology research on fetuses about to be
aborted may in some instances fall into the minimal risk area and
thus require no special modification or waiver of the regulations.
Many more drugs, however, will fall into the category of possible
risk exceeding the minimal level and will require waiver or modifica-
tion because of the special circumstances. A third group of drugs
will possess unknown risk. In this situation the change in the fetus'
status because of the impending abortion does not completely jus-
tify extending the latitude to the risk of teratogenic effects. Admin-
istration of the drug to the fetus in this situation can only be justi-
fied as the lesser of two evils-the fetus about to die is gubjectod to
possible teratogenic effects weighed against experimentation
unwittingly done on fetuses carried to term as in the thalidomide
tragedies.
In conclusion, the regulations do represent an important step
forward in policymaking in the medical-legal area by relating ethi-
cal reasoning to the formulation of public policy. Such a policy seeks
to institutionalize ethics. Unless it realistically assesses society's
interest in improving the health care of pregnant women and fetuses
carried to term, it will not resolve the dilemmas of fetal research.
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